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- 3 /21/94 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME NEW YORK COUNCIL 66 - LOCAL 2574, 
ALLEGANY COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14155 
COUNTY OF ALLEGANY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JAMES T. SIKARAS, ALLEGANY COUNTY ATTORNEY (THOMAS A. MINER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
..This case comes to us on exceptions filed by AFSCME New York 
Council 66 - Local 2574, Allegany County Employees Union (AFSCME) 
to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing 
its charge that the County of Allegany (County) had violated 
§209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by unilaterally subcontracting unit work, dealing 
directly with employees represented by AFSCME and retaliating 
against unit employees for the exercise of rights protected by 
the Act. 
The ALT dismissed the charge, finding that AFSCME did not 
have exclusivity over the work which was subcontracted and that 
there was no evidence of direct dealing with unit employees or of 
any retaliation against them in violation of the Act. In making 
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her determination, the ALJ credited the testimony of Richard 
Young, Superintendent of Public Works since 1988. AFSCME asserts 
in its exceptions that the record does not support the ALJ's 
credibility determination. It also excepts to her conclusions of 
law_._JThe_jSj3jjnty_^ up_p^ ^ 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of 
the ALJ and dismiss AFSCME's exceptions. 
AFSCME's charge involves three general allegations of 
impropriety: unilaterally subcontracting tree removal, salt and 
sand hauling, paving of County roads and operation of loaned 
County equipment; denying unit employees union representation 
during questioning or dealing directly with unit employees 
regarding their terms and conditions of employment; and 
retaliating against certain unit employees for the exercise of 
protected rights. 
At the outset, we confirm the ALJ's credibility resolutions. 
The ALJ found Young to be clear, direct and forthcoming in his 
testimony. In contrast, AFSCME's witnesses were found to be less 
clear and their testimony was not always based on their direct 
knowledge. The ALJ based her decision on the facts as outlined 
by Young and we find no basis to disturb those findings. 
Young's testimony establishes that the County had previously-
used outside contractors to remove trees that were near power 
lines or were otherwise considered too dangerous to be removed 
with County equipment. The use of a private contractor to remove 
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two trees in 1992 was, he testified, consistent with past 
practice, at least during his tenure as Superintendent. 
Likewise, Young testified that the County had for many years 
utilized private contractors to pave County roads and to provide 
vaxxous^materlaXs ox-^equ±pment^used^by_-the„Co,unty in_i-ts_road 
maintenance, in order to get the work done during the relatively 
short warm weather season. The one paving job done by a private 
contractor in 1992 was consistent with this practice and, Young 
believed, was mandated by State law.-7 
Young also explained that, despite AFSCME's allegations to 
the contrary, the County determined on a case-by-case basis 
whether any equipment it loaned to a governmental or private 
entity would be accompanied by a County employee as operator and 
that its practice in this regard had not changed. He examined 
several loan agreements for the relevant time period and 
distinguished those cases in which the County had loaned 
equipment with an operator - usually because of the complexity 
involved in the operation of the equipment - from those in which 
the County had loaned the equipment unaccompanied by a County 
employee. 
This work was funded by the Consolidated Local Highway 
Assistance Program (CHIPS) which provides State funds for 
municipal highway projects. Where the project is in excess 
of one hundred thousand dollars, Young noted, Highway Law, 
§10-c(4)(e) and the accompanying guidelines, require that 
such "work must be performed by contract let by competitive 
bid in accordance with the provisions of section one hundred 
three of the general municipal law". 
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Young also explained the County's operation of its salt and 
sand hauling to municipalities within the County. The 
municipalities within the County plow County roads in the winter. 
The County purchases the sand and salt to be used and it is 
deliv-exed_to_the_muiiicxpa±±:t^ 
by the County, by County employees, or by the municipalities 
themselves. The transporting of the County's sand and salt had 
never been exclusive unit work. In 1992, the County, because of 
a system established by the Association of Towns, was able to 
purchase sand and salt at a savings, both for use on County roads 
and for the municipalities' use on town roads. The material was 
stockpiled at one location within the County and the 
municipalities picked up the sand and salt there. A County 
employee was assigned to load both County trucks and those of the 
participating municipalities. Although under this arrangement 
County employees no longer hauled sand and salt, the unit had 
never performed the hauling exclusively and could not claim 
entitlement to its retention, subject to bargaining. 
The direct dealing allegations involve a meeting of the 
County Legislature's Public Works Committee (Committee) in 
September 1992. A memo sent by the Committee on August 24, 1992 
stated: "Any Public Works employee who wishes to discuss any 
issue with the Committee is invited to attend the Committee 
meeting...on the employees own time and on an individual basis." 
Several unit employees went to the meeting and requested the 
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opportunity to meet with the Committee as a group. When this 
request was denied, some employees left and the remaining 
employees, who were assured of confidentiality, met individually 
with the Committee.-7 Sylor, Chairperson of the Committee, 
testif±ed_that_jno_oxie__askedLjfox_union representation,—but—if 
anyone had, the request would have been granted.-7 There was 
no testimony about the substance of the discussions between the 
Committee members and the employees who attended the meeting. 
The retaliation allegations involve the County's bridge 
construction crew. In October 1992, Sylor proposed the layoff of 
fifteen employees of the DPW because of budget constraints. 
Young had, as part of his 1992 budget, proposed the construction 
•of four town bridges-7 and two County bridges by the DPW's 
bridge construction crew.-7 This work was dependent on the 
The AKJ erred in finding that none of the DPW employees who 
testified at the hearing on the instant charge had actually 
met with the Committee. In fact, two employees - Crane and 
Buzzard - both testified at the hearing that they had 
attended the Committee meeting. This error has no effect on 
the AHT's findings, however, because the employees, while 
testifying that they had attended the meeting, offered no 
evidence about what was discussed with the Committee. 
The ALJ did not credit the testimony of AFSCME's witnesses 
on this point. Champlin, a DPW employee, said that he 
believed he had asked for union representation. Crane also 
testified that he believed that union representation had 
been requested. 
The County builds the bridges for towns within its 
boundaries, using its own crew and receiving reimbursement 
from the towns for the cost of the bridges. 
5/ The crew had constructed several bridges each year during 
Young's tenure. 
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passage of a bond issue by the County Legislature to fund the 
materials needed. The bond issue failed, in large part due to 
the County's existing debts. The Committee then decided to 
refocus the work of the DPW away from bridge construction to 
bridge—maintenance-. The_Committee-, at—its—meeting—dn—October 
1992, questioned Young about the need to continue the bridge 
construction crew since no new bridges were being built. Young 
identified positions that could be cut, not individual employees 
who could be laid off. He noted that the cuts would not cause 
members of the bridge construction crew to lose jobs-7 because 
they had seniority which would allow them to "bump" into other 
positions in the DPW.-7 AFSCME characterized the disbanding of 
the bridge construction crew-7 as being motivated by anti-union 
6/ 
11 
§/ 
At the time the instant charge was filed, no DPW employees 
had been laid off. 
One employee, Crane, who had operated the crane on the 
bridge construction crew, bid to become the operator of the 
"Bridgemaster", a piece of equipment purchased by the County 
in 1990 and used in bridge maintenance work by the DPW's 
bridge maintenance crew. The operator of the "Bridgemaster" 
was defined as an HMEO by the County's Personnel Department; 
therefore, Crane, an HMEO II, was not the only employee 
eligible for the position. AFSCME has filed a grievance on 
this classification. Crane was offered the supervision of 
the bridge maintenance crew before he bid on the 
"Bridgemaster" operator position. 
Despite the assignment of these employees to other jobs, 
when the County built or rehabilitated two bridges later in 
1992, the bridge construction crew was utilized. 
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animus on Young's part and in retaliation for the employees' 
conduct at their September 1992 meeting with the Committee.-7 
Young's testimony clearly establishes, and the AKJ so 
found, that unit employees had never performed any of the at-
-i-s-s-u-e—work— exclusively-.—!-—There-f ore-,—the—Gounty-^s—actions—in 
utilizing nonunit employees to perform tree removal, paving, sand 
and salt hauling and operation of loaned County equipment without 
negotiations do not violate §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. 
The record also establishes that the conduct of the 
Committee meeting in September 1992 does not violate the Act. 
The ALT found that there had been no request for union 
representation at the meeting. She further found that the 
meeting was not disciplinary in nature and that the employees had 
not been compelled to attend. Therefore, the right to union 
representation when an employee being questioned reasonably 
believes that the investigation will lead to disciplinary action 
and so requests union representation, as guaranteed in the 
private sector by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. 
Weinqarten, — ' would not apply. We have not had the occasion to 
-
1
 Young did not stay for the Committee meeting, although he 
was present at the outset, before the employees met with the 
Committee. There was, in any event, no testimony concerning 
what occurred during the meeting or even what topics were 
discussed. No connection was established, therefore, 
between the meeting and the disbanding of the bridge 
construction crew. 
—' Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB [^3083 (1985) . 
117
 420 U.S. 251 (1975) . 
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determine whether such rights extend to public sector 
employees—'' and this case does not require us to decide that 
issue. 
In addition, we find that the County's conduct here does not 
constitute—the—type—of—direct—dealing—which—has—been—found—to 
violate the Act.—7 The County's invitation to attend the 
meeting to "discuss any issue" was not, by itself, an offer to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment with the individual 
employees which would violate the Act. Further, there is no 
evidence whatsoever in the record about the type or content of 
the discussions that took place during the Committee meeting. We 
cannot find that the employees were asked to outline any specific 
problems they were having with the Superintendent of the DPW or 
that the County attempted to establish a reciprocal relationship 
with the employees to the exclusion of their bargaining 
representative, AFSCME, in violation of the Act. 
Finally, there is no evidence of retaliatory actions or 
harassment taken by the County against unit employees for the 
exercise of protected rights. The only protected activity which 
took place during the time covered by the charge was the alleged 
request for union representation at the Committee meeting. The 
Section 75 of the Civil Service Law was recently amended to 
provide for the right of union representation at a 
disciplinary interview. 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 279. 
Monticello Cent. Sch. Dist. , 20 PERB J[3067 (1987) ; Albany 
Cent. Sch. Dist. , 16 PERB [^3101 (1983) . 
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ALJ did not credit the testimony of AFSCME's witnesses that such 
a request was made. Further, AFSCME did not establish that 
retaliatory actions were taken against any employees in the time 
following the Committee meeting.—7 The reassignment of bridge 
constructioxL-crew_jmembers,, Young_credibly—explained,—was^a-resuIt 
of a loss of funding for the work that had been scheduled for the 
remainder of the year, not in retaliation for the activities of 
any of them at the Committee meeting. 
Accordingly, AFSCME's exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
AFSCME alleged at the hearing that Champlin had been 
questioned by Young regarding the weighing of his truck in 
retaliation for his request for union representation. This 
incident occurred after the instant charge was filed and was 
not the subject of any timely amendment. Therefore, it is 
not considered. 
2B- 3/21/94 
) STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME COUNCIL 66, LOCAL 930, ERIE COUNTY 
WATER AUTHORITY BLUE COLLAR EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12365 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL M. POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT J. LANE, SR., ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
AFSCME Council 66, Local 93 0, Erie County Water Authority 
Blue Collar Employees Union (AFSCME) excepts to an Administrative 
Law Judge's (ALT) decision dismissing, after a hearing, its 
charge against the Erie County Water Authority (Authority). 
AFSCME alleges in its charge that the Authority violated 
§209-a.l(a), (c), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it established a career ladder for 
newly-created positions which it assigned to a white-collar unit 
of Authority employees represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). The ALJ 
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dismissed the charge pursuant to the Authority's motion made on 
the second day of hearing at the end of AFSCME's direct case. 
AFSCME's (a) and (c) violations are premised separately upon 
the Authority's alleged improper motivation in establishing the 
career ladder and assigning the positions to CSEA, and upon a 
direct dealing allegation. With respect to the first allegation, 
we have found in an earlier proceeding that the placement of the 
new positions in CSEA's unit is most appropriate.-7 Moreover, 
the AKJ held that, despite a difficult labor relationship between 
the Authority and AFSCME, there was no demonstrated linkage 
between the decisions to create a career ladder and to assign the 
newly-created titles to CSEA's unit and any animosity toward 
AFSCME or its leadership. With respect to the second allegation, 
the AKJ held that a letter from William Holcomb, the Authority's 
Director of Human Resources, to Richard Slisz, the Erie County 
Commissioner of Personnel, concerning the career ladder and civil 
service examinations for certain of the positions did not 
constitute direct dealing in violation of the Act. 
The (d) violation was dismissed by the AKJ on a finding that 
the creation of the positions and the career ladder and the 
placement of the positions in CSEA's unit were not unilateral 
actions involving mandatorily negotiable terms and conditions of 
employment. The subsection (e) violation was dismissed for 
1;Erie County Water Auth. , 26 PERB fl3030, aff 'a 26 PERB [^4001 
(1993). Much of the record in that proceeding was incorporated 
) as part of this record by agreement of the parties. 
' " ) 
Board - U-12365 -3 
failure of proof, although the ALJ noted simultaneously that that 
allegation had been eliminated from an amended version of the 
charge. 
AFSCME argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred by 
granting the Authority's motion to dismiss because the record, 
read most reasonably and favorably to it, has evidence of each 
allegation sufficient to withstand the Authority's motion to 
dismiss. In response, the Authority argues that, in creating the 
positions, establishing a career ladder for them, and assigning 
the positions to CSEA's unit, it was doing only what the Act and 
its contract with AFSCME permitted it to do. The Authority 
submits that the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are correct and that her decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
In the prior unit placement proceeding involving these 
parties, we determined that the Authority was correct in its 
belief that the newly-created positions were most appropriately 
assigned to CSEA's unit. Although AFSCME has appealed our 
decision and order in that case, our findings there are relevant 
to the disposition of AFSCME's interference and discrimination 
allegations here. As this record only confirms, AFSCME's primary 
concern is that certain promotional opportunities for AFSCME's 
unit employees under the Authority's career ladder and approved 
unit placement will be to positions in CSEA's unit. To prevent 
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that outcome, AFSCME contested the appropriateness of the unit 
placement and now the motives for it. As the ALT held, however, 
there is insufficient evidence that the Authority acted for any 
reasons other than what it considered to be its best managerial 
interests and its firmly held and forcefully stated belief that 
the positions it created belonged most appropriately in the 
white-collar unit, represented by CSEA, not the blue-collar unit 
represented by AFSCME. 
AFSCME argues, however, that the ALJ's dismissal after the 
close of its direct case pursuant to the Authority's motion 
deprived it of a "right" to develop or supplement a record 
through cross-examination of the Authority's witnesses. This 
same argument was made to the ALJ, who properly rejected it. In 
effect, AFSCME's argument is based on the theory that a 
respondent's only option after a charging party rests is to 
proceed with a defense. A respondent is plainly entitled, 
however, to act in what it considers to be its lawful interests 
and is free to move for dismissal of a charge, which motion an 
ALJ may grant or deny in the sound exercise of discretion and 
judgment. AFSCME's claimed right of cross-examination exists 
only if and to the extent the Authority had elected to call a 
witness on its behalf, which it did not. AFSCME, therefore, 
assumed a risk that it had satisfied its burden of proof when it 
rested. 
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We are in agreement with the ALJ that proof of a prevailing 
contentious labor relationship is insufficient by itself to prove 
that any particular act taken within the context of that 
relationship is necessarily and always improperly motivated.-' 
We further find and agree that the testimony of AFSCME's three 
witnesses is insufficient to establish any of the violations of 
the Act alleged. 
AFSCME also excepts to the ALJ's dismissal of its direct 
dealing allegation. Holcomb wrote to Slisz in the latter7s 
capacity as the County Civil Service Commission representative. 
Holcomb's letter explains that a promotional examination could 
not be held for certain of the at-issue titles and he requests 
Slisz to schedule an open competitive examination. AFSCME 
objects only to Holcomb's statement in the letter that AFSCME 
declined to discuss the arrangements which would be necessary to 
permit the scheduling of a promotional examination. Even if we 
were to assume, however, that this part of Holcomb's letter 
inaccurately represents AFSCME's actions or position, the letter 
does not constitute direct dealing, for the reasons given by the 
ALJ. The letter was informational, it was not sent to any unit 
employees, and it did not concern any offers regarding terms and 
conditions of employment. 
=/See Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp. , 26 PERB f3024 
(1993). 
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In summary, we find that the ALJ properly dismissed the 
charge in all respects for failure of proof and that her decision 
to grant the Authority's motion is consistent with existing 
precedent. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
]G\~\<~K]X- JkirNS&fL^ 
Pauline R. Kmse l la , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
2C- 3 /21 /94 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF TONAWANDA POLICE 
OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging—Party-, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14668 
CITY OF TONAWANDA, 
Respondent. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
NORMAN J. STOCKER, for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Tonawanda (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) finding that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
transferred the work of police officers who are represented by 
the City of Tonawanda Police Officers' Association (Association). 
The ALJ made that determination after deeming the allegations in 
the charge admitted pursuant to §204.3(f) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). Section 204.3(f) of the Rules provides that 
an ALJ may deem the material facts alleged in a charge admitted 
if the respondent fails to file a timely answer. The ALJ invoked 
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this section of the Rules because the City's representative, 
Norman J. Stocker, failed to appear at a rescheduled conference 
and failed to submit an answer to the charge by the date of that 
conference. 
The—City— argues—in—its—exceptions—tefa-a-t—fe-h-e—ALJ—abused—her 
discretion in invoking §2 04.3(f) of the Rules because its cited 
failures were unintentional and nonprejudicial. The Association 
has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the ALJ's decision and the City's arguments, 
we reverse and remand because the facts which have been 
established do not persuade us that invocation of §204.3(f) of 
the Rules was justified in this case. 
The City did not appear for the conference originally 
scheduled for August 23, 1993. The ALT contacted Stocker who 
informed her that he had not received "the papers", i.e. the 
charge and notice of conference,-' which also informs a 
respondent of the necessity to answer the charge, the time frame 
within which the answer must be filed, and the possible 
consequences of a failure to file a timely answer. 
The ALJ rescheduled the conference for September 9, 1993, 
and confirmed that conference by letter dated August 25, 1993 to 
Stocker and the Association's representative. On that date, she 
-'The notice of conference was mailed by first-class mail to the 
City's Labor Relations Department on July 13, 1993, together with 
a copy of the charge. Neither the charge nor the notice of 
conference names a specific representative for the City. 
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also sent Stocker a copy of the charge (but not the notice of 
conference form), which Stocker received on August 30, 1993. 
When the City did not appear for the September 9 conference, the 
ALT called Stocker's office and was told he was not there. 
Stoeke-r'-s—secretary—apparently—reached—him—immedia-tel-y—and—he 
returned the ALT's call. Stocker told the ALT in that 
conversation that he had forgotten to attend the conference 
because he had neglected to calendar the rescheduled conference 
date.27 
The ALT then invoked §204.3(f) of the Rules and found, as 
alleged, that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it 
used auxiliary police to perform policing functions during the 
City's annual Memorial Day Parade. 
Our review of a ruling by an ALT involving an exercise of 
discretion is narrow under an abuse of discretion standard. The 
precise meaning is clearly dependent upon the specific facts of 
each case. An abuse of discretion has been taken to mean "no 
more than that [the reviewing body] will not intervene, so long 
-
xIn support of its exceptions, the City filed two affidavits. 
One is from Stocker detailing his version of the facts concerning 
the circumstances described in the ALT's decision and the other 
is from the City's Chief of Police regarding the City's prior use 
of auxiliary police. In view of our decision, it is not 
necessary for us to consider any aspect of either affidavit. 
Board - U-14668 -4 
as [the reviewing body] thinks that the (discretion exercised) is 
within permissible limits."-7 
The City's failure to attend the first conference was 
excused by the ALJ, who accepted Stocker's representation that he 
had—net—received—any—"papers"- concerning—the—charge—or— a 
conference. There is, moreover, nothing in the ALJ's description 
of the facts to evidence that Stocker was notified of the 
necessity for an answer or of the possible consequences of a 
failure to file a timely answer, as is our practice. Having 
accepted Stocker's representation that he had not received the 
charge or the notice of conference, and having sent him a copy of 
the charge on August 25, 1993, it was not unreasonable for 
Stocker to conclude that the City's time to answer the charge 
would run from his receipt of it from the ALJ. This being so, 
ten working days had not elapsed between August 30, 1993, when 
Stocker first received a copy of the charge from the ALJ, and the 
September 9, 1993 conference.-7 The City's answer could be 
considered late as of September 9, 1993 only if it is presumed 
that the City had received a copy of the charge pursuant to the 
^
7Barnett v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 34 F.2d 916, 920 
(2d Cir. 1929), modified and aff'd sub nom. United States v. 
Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 283 U.S. 738 (19 30), cited with 
approval in Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Products, Inc., 690 F.2d 
312 (2d Cir. 1982). 
-^Respondents are afforded ten working days from their receipt of 
the charge from the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation to answer. Rules §204.3(a). 
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initial notice of conference. We do not know from the facts 
relied upon by the ALT whether the City ever got a copy of the 
charge or the initial notice of conference. It appears from the 
ALJ's decision that she presumed that the City had received the 
charge—pursuant—feo—the—Juiy—1-3—mailing—and—neglected—^to—forward 
it to Stocker. No facts stated in the ALJ's decision, however, 
support actual receipt by the City. Even if there is a 
rebuttable presumption of receipt on mailing for other purposes, 
we do not consider that presumption to be necessarily controlling 
in a determination to invoke §204.3(f) of our Rules. In any 
event, the ALT's actions in rescheduling the conference and 
sending Stocker a copy of the charge, well after the time for 
answering had expired, certainly suggested that the ALJ had 
excused any failure to file an answer until after Stocker 
received the charge. To thereafter penalize the City for its 
failure to answer the charge first mailed to the City is 
inconsistent with the ALJ's earlier acceptance of the City's 
explanation and is not warranted. In this case, therefore, the 
City is reasonably faulted only for a negligent failure to attend 
one conference. Without minimizing the inconvenience caused to 
the Association and the ALJ by Stocker's nonappearance at the 
conferences, whether excusable or not, we do not consider the 
ALJ's invocation of §2 04.3(f) of our Rules to have been within 
permissible limits in the particular circumstances of this case. 
We have reviewed the decisions in which §204.3(f) has been 
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invoked and are persuaded that it is most often applied when the 
record shows some intentional or contumacious refusal by a 
respondent to file an answer or to attend a conference despite 
notice and actual knowledge of the consequences.-7 Without 
suggesting—that—these—are—the—only— eA-reumstanees—in—which : 
§204.3(f) of the Rules may be properly invoked, the circumstances 
here did not warrant its invocation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with our decision herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
ffj.i^L^ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
iMMz- t. 
L. Eisenberg, Mem: 
5/ 
-See, e.g. , Town of Henrietta, 19 PERB [^3067 (1986) 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 1170, COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OP 
AMERICA, APL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3449 
TOWN OP GREECE, 
Employer. 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, PAHRINGER, ROLL, SALISBURY & CAMBRIA 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case come to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Greece (Town) to a decision of the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director). Local 1170, 
Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA) filed a petition 
seeking, as amended, to represent a unit consisting of the 
following titles: Town Clerk, Receiver of Taxes, Fire Marshal, 
Director of Youth Services, Building Inspector, Assessor, Library 
Director, and Director of Parks and Recreation. The Director 
issued a decision^ holding that the Receiver of Taxes, an 
elected official, was not a public employee within the meaning of 
the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act), but otherwise 
1;25 PERB J[4002 (1992) . 
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finding that the unit sought was most appropriate. He rejected 
the Town's argument that the incumbents of the other titles were 
managerial or confidential within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the 
Act. 
CWA excepted to the Director's determination regarding the 
Receiver—of—Taxes^,—T-h-e—Tow-n-7—i-n—:its—exceptions^—argued—that—the 
positions of Director of Youth Services and Director of Parks and 
Recreation had been abolished and should, therefore, be excluded 
from the unit. It further argued that a new position, Director 
of Human Services, which had been created after the close of the 
record, should be excluded from the unit because the incumbent 
had the responsibilities of the two abolished titles and this new 
title was not covered by the petition. We remanded the case-7 
to the Director to take further evidence as to the status of the 
positions of Director of Youth Services and the Director of Parks 
and Recreation and, deeming CWA's petition to have been amended 
to include the position of Director of Human Services, to take 
evidence- as to the coverage and appropriate uniting for that 
position. 
The Director found on remand that the position of Director 
of Youth Services had been abolished at the time the position of 
Director of Human Services was created. He, therefore, excluded 
the abolished title from the bargaining unit. He determined, 
however, that the position of Director of Parks and Recreation 
had not been abolished; the Town had simply not funded it for the 
1992 fiscal year. He included that position, although currently 
2/25 PERB [^3047 (1992) . 
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vacant, in the bargaining unit. Finally, the Director decided 
that the Director of Human Services was a managerial employee 
based on the duties he performed. He found, however, that those 
managerial duties were peculiar to the current incumbent of the 
position and that those duties exceeded the scope of the 
position's—job—deseription-i He^—there£ore7—included—the—t-i-tie—i-n 
the unit, excluding it from coverage for only so long as the 
present incumbent holds the position. 
The Town now excepts to the Director's decision that the 
position of Director of Parks and Recreation has not been 
abolished. It argues that the title should be excluded from the 
unit because the position no longer exists. The Town further 
argues that the position of Director of Human Services should be 
excluded from the unit because it is a managerial position, 
regardless of the identity of the incumbent. CWA supports the 
Director's decision on the facts and the law. 
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Director's 
decision. 
Two witnesses testified at the hearing on remand: Joanne 
Calvaruso, the Town's Director of Personnel, and Frank Ardino, 
former Director of Youth Services and current Director of Human 
Services. Calvaruso testified that during the Town's 1992 budget 
preparation, the Town became aware that Basil Marella, the 
Director of Parks and Recreation, was retiring. The Town decided 
to consolidate the Department of Parks and Recreation and the 
Department of Youth Services to better meet the needs of its 
constituency and to realize economic savings. Under the auspices 
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of the new Department of Human Services, the Town sought to 
combine adult and senior citizen recreation programs with youth 
programs and to bring other programs, such as the food bank and a 
community "clothes closet", under one department. Only Ardino 
was considered by the Town to head the new department. He had 
worked— closely—with—the—Town—Supervisor—to-design—the—new 
department and to develop the job description for the new 
Director of Human Services. Ardino, aware that the Town wanted 
him to take the position, sought to give it a greater degree of 
autonomy than the previous position of Director of Youth Services 
had enjoyed. The position was, through Calvaruso's efforts, 
classified as a noncompetitive position by the Monroe County 
Civil Service Commission. Upon Ardino's appointment as Director 
of Human Services, his former position, Director of Youth 
Services, was abolished. Calvaruso testified that the Town Board 
also abolished the position of Director of Parks and Recreation, 
and did not fund it in the 1992 budget.-7 There is no evidence 
in the record to contradict Calvaruso's testimony that the 
position of Director of Parks and Recreation was abolished, even 
though it was not done in the same document that abolished the 
Director of Youth Services position. The duties of the Director 
of Parks and Recreation are now being performed by the Director 
of Human Services. 
-''There are no incumbents listed on the budget line for Director 
of Parks and Recreation and no funds are allocated for salary for 
the position. 
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The Director found that Ardino is managerial based upon his 
exercise of independent judgment and control over the Town's 
recreational programs. Neither party disputes that his role in 
developing his department's program, applying for grant approval, 
hiring private contractors, supervising staff, developing the 
departmental—budget,—attending—T-ow-n—Boardexecutive—sessions, 
chairing the Human Services subcommittee of the Town Board and 
participating in the Town's new Total Quality Management 
Program-7 warrants this conclusion. The issue before us is 
whether these duties are inherent in the position of Director of 
Human Services or whether they are unique to Ardino. 
A comparison of the job descriptions for the Director of 
Youth Services and the Director of Human Services illustrates the 
differences between the positions. The Director of Youth 
Services performed "under the general direction of the Town 
Supervisor and in accordance with policies and program objectives 
established by the Youth Advisory Board or Agency." The Director 
of Human Services "establishes program goals and objectives in 
cooperation with youth advisory board, recreation commission and 
-''After CWA's petition was filed, and after the hearings held 
prior to the Director's first decision in this case, the Town 
implemented a Total Quality Management Program. As part of the 
program, Ardino and the other department heads meet twice monthly 
to develop Town policy and mission statements. At these 
meetings, the department heads discuss their proposed budgets and 
prioritize their departmental needs to fit within an overall Town 
budget. This group also meets regularly with the Town Supervisor 
to strategize about the Town's mission and the best methods for 
delivering services. 
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town legislative body",-7 with no direct supervision by the Town 
Supervisor. 
The Director found that the job description of the Director 
of Human Services was not distinguishable from the job 
descriptions of other department heads that he had earlier found 
to—comprise—an—appropriate—unit—for-bargainings In—hrs—initial— 
decision creating the at-issue bargaining unit, the Director 
noted that much evidence was heard about the role of these 
employees in policy formulation. He found that "[w]ithout 
exception, however, all the employees in the proposed unit are 
either charged with carrying out the mandates of state law, 
regulation or local ordinance, without the ability to deviate 
from such dictates, or are in positions where their decisions are 
subject to the approval of advisory or governing boards."-7 
Here, however, there is evidence that the role of many 
department heads has changed since the Town implemented its Total 
Quality Management Control Program. Other directors, who were 
excluded from the unit pursuant to an agreement between CWA and 
-
7The job description for the Director of Human Services also 
requires him/her to "coordinate and maintain contacts with 
internal and external youth and senior service groups and 
agencies to develop resource alternatives and exchange support 
services; coordinate with private, non-profit groups to provide 
food and clothing to residents in need in the community; prepare 
and present preliminary budget, monitor budget expenditures; meet 
with parents, schools, neighborhood and community groups to 
solicit cooperation; promote various programs through speeches 
and publicity materials; prepare or supervise the preparation of 
grant applications for federal, state or local funding; 
interview, train and supervise staff, define staff roles, 
schedule staff assignments; and attend Town Board, Recreation 
Commission and Youth Board meetings." 
5/25 PERB f4002, at 4013 (1992). 
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the Town, apparently have many of the same rights and 
responsibilities as the Director of Human Services.-7 
The job description for the Director of Human Services is 
broadly drawn and is less restrictive than the job description 
for the Director of Youth Services. Against the job description 
f-or-^ the Director—of—Human—Serv-i-ees-7—A-rd-ino-'-s—tes-ti-mon-y—a-nd 
evidence regarding the changes in the roles of the other, 
excluded, department heads, we cannot conclude that the 
managerial functions of the Director of Human Services are unique 
to Ardino and not inherent in the position itself. As we have 
previously held: 
[0]rdinarily the position held by a person designated 
as managerial will not be included in a negotiating 
unit. That is so because in the usual situation the 
regular assignments and responsibilities of a person 
warrant the designation of the incumbent as 
managerial.-7 
However, where managerial duties are personal to a particular 
incumbent of a position and are not part of the job description 
for the position and it cannot reasonably be determined from the 
record that any successors to the position will perform the same 
responsibilities, the position is appropriately placed in the 
bargaining unit even though the incumbent is designated 
managerial.-7 Here, the managerial duties performed by Ardino 
as the Director of Human Services are generally included in his 
-
7Ardino testified that he no longer had to obtain line item 
approval from the Town's finance director to make internal budget 
adjustments, but he also testified that other directors had the 
same authority. 
g7Ellenvile Cent. Sch. Dist. . 16 PERB ^[3066, at 3104 (1983). 
?7Id. 
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job description and the uncontroverted testimony establishes that 
other directors perform similar job duties. There is no basis to 
conclude, on this record, that Ardino's successor in the position 
of Director of Human Services will not perform the same duties as 
Ardino, with the same degree of autonomy. If, upon Ardino's 
departure^—^the—duties—assigned to—the—next—Director—of—Human 
Services are changed, CWA may file the appropriate petition with 
us to consider the inclusion of the position in its unit at that 
time. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that the position of 
Director of Parks and Recreation has been abolished and is, 
therefore, not properly included in the at-issue bargaining 
unit.—/ We further find that the Director of Human Services is 
managerial and should, therefore, also be excluded from the unit. 
We find the most appropriate bargaining unit to be as 
follows: 
Included: Town Clerk, Fire Marshal, Building 
Inspector, Assessor and Library Director. 
Excluded: Town Supervisor, Town Board members and all other 
employees of the Town. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that an election by secret ballot 
be held under the supervision of the Director among the eligible 
public employees in the unit here determined to be appropriate, 
—'Even if we were to find, as urged by CWA, that the position was 
merely vacant and not abolished, it would not be appropriately 
placed in the unit at this time. There is no evidence in the 
record that the Town ever intends to fill the position and, as 
the duties previously assigned to it are now within the 
jurisdiction of the Director of Human Services, we have no basis 
to conclude that the duties to be performed by the position, if 
filled, would warrant its placement in CWA's unit. 
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unless CWA submits to the Director, within fifteen days from the 
date of its receipt of this decision, evidence to satisfy the 
requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Town shall submit to the 
Director and to CWA, within fifteen days from the date of its 
receipt— o-f—this—d-ee-i-s-ion-7—a-n—aiph-a-be-fei-z-ed—list^ of—a-li—eligible 
employees within the unit here determined to be appropriate. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which have been 
filed, respectively, by the Wayne-Finger Lakes Association of 
School Support Personnel, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) and 
the Wayne-Finger Lakes Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
(BOCES). The charge as amended alleges that the BOCES violated 
its bargaining obligations under §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it assigned teacher 
aides the duties of a teaching assistant and failed to pay the 
aides at the teaching assistants' higher rate of pay. 
The ALJ held that the charge was timely filed, but she 
dismissed it on a finding that Article XI(J) of the parties' 
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current contract,-7 which entitles employees who are assigned to 
a higher rated position for more than four hours to the pay of 
the higher rated position, waived any right of further bargaining 
regarding out-of-title work assignments. Assuming that the aides 
were instructing students as alleged by the Association, the ALJ 
held that Article XI(J) gave the District the right to make those 
assignments subject only to a duty to pay the employees at the 
higher contractual rate. 
The Association argues that the ALJ erred in accepting a 
waiver defense and erred in her interpretation of Article XI(J). 
The District argues in its cross-exceptions that the ALJ 
erred in finding that the charge was timely filed and in making 
an implicit finding or assumption that the teacher aides were 
instructing the students under their supervisor. It agrees, 
however, with the ALJ in her disposition of the charge on the 
merits. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The charge stems from the teacher aides' assignments within 
the BOCES' Social Skills Development Program (SSD). In 
-'Article XI (J) provides as follows: 
Except as noted in Article XI, I, [substitute work] 
when an employee is assigned to a higher rated position 
for more than 4 hours during any work day, that 
employee will be compensated for the full day at the 
entry level rate for that higher rated position or be 
given a 5% differential above the unit member's regular 
hourly rate, whichever is higher. 
^ 
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January 1992, the BOCES introduced a community-based component to 
the existing SSD program. Students with behavior problems are 
transported to various community sites in the company of a 
teacher aide to perform different jobs under the supervision of 
the aides for approximately two hours per day. The program's 
goals are to have students learn appropriate behaviors in a 
community setting, to have the students practice what they have 
been taught and to have them realize the consequences of their 
behavior. 
Christy Stacey Bassage was the first aide assigned under 
this aspect of the SSD program in or around January 1992. She 
was assigned to monitor students working at a local Burger King. 
The Association filed a contract grievance regarding Bassage's 
assignment, which it claimed to be out-of-title, necessitating a 
higher rate of pay. The Association later withdrew the grievance 
for reasons which are not apparent on this record. No other 
relevant teacher aide assignments were made until the start of 
the 1992-93 school year. 
In finding the charge to have been timely filed, the A U 
held that Bassage's assignment in January 1992 was "an isolated 
incident unconnected to the full implementation . . . [of the] 
regular operation of the SSD community-based program." The ALJ 
ran the time to file the charge from October 1992, making the 
charge filed on January 10, 1993, timely under §204.1(a)(1) of 
our Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
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In urging our reversal of the ALJ's timeliness 
determination, the BOCES argues that the time to file must be run 
from January 1992, when the first community-based assignment was 
given to Bassage. According to BOCES, the program was simply 
expanded at the start of the 1992-93 school year, an expansion 
which does not constitute a new time from which to run the four-
month filing period. 
As the District itself argues, the time to file an improper 
practice charge begins to run from the date the charging party 
knew or should have known of the acts constituting the improper 
practice.-/ The Association's charge is grounded upon the 
BOCES' alleged utilization of teacher aides in an instructional 
capacity. The Association was not reasonably positioned to know 
that the aides were arguably being used in that capacity until 
after the assignments began regularly during the 1992-93 school 
year. Therefore, we affirm the ALJ's determination that the 
charge was timely filed. 
We also affirm the ALJ's decision to consider a waiver 
defense. Although, as noted by the ALJ, BOCES did not denominate 
any of its affirmative defenses as "waiver", it is clear from its 
answers to the charge as filed and amended that it claimed that 
the contract was the source of both parties' rights with respect 
to the assignments in issue and that the dispute was contractual 
in nature. The relevant contract section was specifically quoted 
-
7See, e.g. . City of Yonkers, 7 PERB ?[3007 (1974) . 
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in the BOCES' answers. In agreement with the ALT, we hold that 
the BOCES' answers satisfied the pleading requirements of 
§204.3(c)(2) of the Rules and gave the Association sufficiently 
clear notice that the contract was being raised in defense to the 
Association's allegations in other than a strictly jurisdictional 
sense.-7 Therefore, we dismiss the Association's exceptions 
which are directed to the ALJ's consideration of a waiver 
defense. 
The Association also argues that the ALJ erred in the 
interpretation of Article XI(J). That section of the contract is 
captioned "Temporary Transfers". The Association argues that, 
given its title, Article XI(J) cannot have any application to 
teacher aide assignments within the SSD program because those 
assignments are permanent, ongoing and regular, albeit usually of 
two hours or less per day. There was no evidence regarding the 
history or application of Article XI(J), but its language is 
unqualified. It affords both the BOCES and unit employees clear 
rights. The BOCES is given the right to make out-of-title 
assignments to unit employees, but the employees must be paid a 
higher rate of pay when the assignment lasts for more than four 
hours on any given day. The caption to Article XI(J) is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ's interpretation. The 
reference to "temporary" may, for example, mean only those 
assignments of less than four hours' duration in any given day, 
^Compare Clarkstown Cent. Sch. Dist., 24 PERB f3047 (1991). 
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not, as the Association contends, the number of days during which 
the assignments are made. In any event, absent other evidence, 
the Article's caption cannot control the plain language of the 
parties' agreement itself. In making this conclusion, we do not, 
any more so than the AKJ, find that the teacher aides were given 
instructional duties, that they were otherwise used out of title 
or, if so, whether they are entitled under Article XI(J) to a 
higher rate of pay. We hold only that, assuming the aides were 
used in an instructional capacity, the District's assignment of 
those duties to them was not subject to any further bargaining 
obligations. Similarly, whether the assignments were consistent 
with other laws or regulations-' is an issue which is not before 
us. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions and cross-
exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
f^^tKA. 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Ai^La-Z*. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric^a.' Schmertz, Member 
-'See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, §80.33 (1987) 
These regulations of the Commissioner of Education define and 
restrict the duties which may be assigned to a teacher aide. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA). CSEA excepts to a decision by an Administrative Law 
J-u-d-g-e—(-A-LJ-)—dismissing—two—improper—practice—charges—il^had—fiied 
against the State of New York - Unified Court System (UCS) and to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing its objections to a 
September 9, 1992 representation election it lost to the Ninth 
Judicial District Court Employees Association (Association).-' 
CSEA alleges in its first improper practice charge that 
Marie Kuchta, the chief clerk of the White Plains City Court, 
cancelled a meeting scheduled for March 31, 1992, at which CSEA 
was to speak with unit employees about problems it was having 
with its Employee Benefits Fund, and permitted, instead, Martin 
Sharp, president of the Association, to make a presentation to 
the employees about the benefits afforded by the Association.-7 
CSEA alleges in its second improper practice charge that 
Kuchta permitted unit employee Betty Stewart, an Association 
-''Of 18 eligible employees in the City of White Plains 
negotiating unit, 8 voted for the Association and 4 voted for 
CSEA, the incumbent bargaining agent for the unit. There was one 
challenged ballot cast by a nonunit employee. Six eligible unit 
employees did not vote. 
-'There are approximately 8 00 UCS employees within the Ninth 
Judicial District represented in 17 negotiating units by 4 
different employee organizations, including CSEA and the 
Association. 
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supporter, repeated access to unit employees during work time, 
while denying CSEA similar access. It also alleges that Kuchta 
gave vacation time and a promotion to unit employee Antoinette 
Frezza. Each improper practice charge theorizes that the acts 
described were taken with the purpose and effect of influencing 
the election, in violation of §209-a.l(a) and (b) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
CSEA also filed objections to the conduct of the election 
itself and conduct affecting the results of the election. The 
Director dismissed without a hearing the objections to the 
conduct of the election itself-' and certain of CSEA's 
objections to conduct affecting the results of the election.-7 
CSEA's only exception to these aspects of the Director's decision 
is to his finding that Stewart's statement to Kuchta, while 
embracing her, that "we won, we won", could not have affected the 
results of the election because the comment was made after the 
ballots had been counted. CSEA argues that this statement and 
-''The objections to the conduct of the election itself concern 
the absence of five unit employees from work on the day of the 
election and the status of the individual who cast the challenged 
ballot. CSEA withdrew the latter allegation during the 
proceedings before the Director. 
-''The objections in this respect concern Kuchta's alleged 
"harassment" and "pressuring" of CSEA officers and unit members. 
The Director dismissed these objections because the incidents 
occurred either years before the representation petition was 
filed or after the election was held. The Director dismissed an 
objection based upon an alleged "unusual" grant of vacation leave 
to three unit employees, including Frezza, on a finding that the 
grant was not aberrational. 
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action evidence Kuchta's preference for the Association and her 
pervasive influence over the election results. 
The remaining election objections incorporate the 
allegations in the improper practice charges and add an 
allegation that Kuchta invited Stewart to a meeting in late May 
1992 involving the employment of unit employee Helen Fox.-7 
These objections were consolidated for hearing before the ALJ 
assigned to the improper practice charges. 
After hearing, the ALJ dismissed both improper practice 
charges. She dismissed the first charge because there was no 
evidence that Kuchta invited Sharp to speak to unit employees on 
March 31, 1992, or that she cancelled the meeting with CSEA to 
enable Sharp to speak with unit employees that same day and time. 
The ALJ also dismissed the second improper practice charge. 
The allegations regarding unequal access to unit employees were 
dismissed because only CSEA unit president Rose Impallomeni's 
testimony supported those allegations and the ALJ did not credit 
her testimony based upon her behavior, demeanor and the nature of 
her responses to questions during the hearing. The ALJ held, 
alternatively, that the access allegations would have been 
dismissed even if Impallomeni's testimony had been credited. The 
ALJ held that the record, at most, established only that 
Impallomeni was denied access to City Court where she did not 
-'Fox was seeking a transfer because she felt that Kuchta had 
unfairly criticized her personally or her work. 
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work.-7 She found no evidence that CSEA had any less access to 
unit employees than did the Association. 
The allegations concerning Frezza's alleged promotion-7 
were dismissed because there was no evidence that Kuchta ever 
suggested to Frezza that she not vote, that Kuchta extracted a 
promise from Frezza in that regard, or that Kuchta was involved 
in the personnel transaction involving Frezza. In reaching this 
conclusion, the ALJ declined to draw a negative inference against 
UCS from Kuchta's not testifying, noting, moreover, that CSEA had 
failed to produce any facts in support of its charge which a 
negative inference could corroborate. 
The Director adopted the ALJ's relevant findings of fact, 
) credibility resolutions and conclusions of law in dismissing most 
of the remaining election objections. 
With the submission of its memorandum of law to the 
. Director, CSEA changed-7 the election objection concerning 
Kuchta's alleged invitation to Stewart to attend the May 1992 
meeting involving Fox because it became apparent during the 
hearing that Kuchta had not invited Stewart to the meeting nor 
-
7Impallomeni is a senior court reporter assigned to Supreme 
Court in White Plains, located in the Westchester County 
Courthouse, which is near the White Plains City Court. 
-
7As discussed infra, Frezza was not promoted but had her part-
time status changed to full-time to fill a temporary vacancy. 
-
7CSEA had alleged initially that Kuchta invited Stewart to the 
meeting or was responsible for her presence. 
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had she otherwise been responsible for Stewart's appearance.-7 
CSEA now argues that the meeting with Fox reinforced a sense 
among employees that UCS favored the Association and contributed 
to the "insidious atmosphere" created by Kuchta. The Director 
did not decide whether CSEA could change the basis for this 
particular election - objection because he dismissed it on a 
different ground. The Director found that Stewart appeared at 
the meeting by directive of the UCS judge who was conducting the 
meeting, because the judge wanted an "objective observer", 
picking Stewart by random circumstance. Stewart sat silently 
throughout the meeting, she was not held out to be an Association 
representative or treated by UCS as such, and the Director found 
no evidence that any unit employees other than Fox and Stewart 
ever learned of the meeting or Stewart's presence. 
CSEA also alleges in its election objections that Frezza 
refrained from voting because Kuchta had given her a promotion. 
As did the ALJ in conjunction with the similar improper practice 
allegation, the Director dismissed this election objection 
essentially for lack of proof. He determined that Frezza's 
temporary move from part-time to full-time status in August 1992 
was not a promotion, but that even if it could be characterized 
as such, other unit employees were unaware of it or of Frezza's 
alleged intent not to vote because of it. Moreover, the Director 
found no evidence that Kuchta in any way pressured or influenced 
-'This objection was not the subject of either of CSEA's improper 
practice charges. 
Board - U-13621, U-14032 & C-3944 -7 
Frezza's decision not to vote or that Kuchta was involved in the 
change in Frezza's position from part-time to full-time status. 
The subject of CSEA's remaining election objection is the 
same as its first improper practice charge involving Kuchta's 
cancellation of CSEA's March 1992 meeting. The Director 
dismissed this objection because CSEA's allegation concerned 
conduct which occurred before the petition was filed on April 18, 
1992. The Director held that this pre-petition conduct could not 
be considered because it was not part of any objectionable 
conduct continuing post-petition. The Director also determined 
that even on CSEA's own allegations, which were not proven, this 
was "an isolated and remote event", insufficient to warrant 
setting aside the election because, as found by the ALJ, CSEA 
otherwise had access to unit employees similar to that enjoyed by 
the Association. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision dismissing its first 
improper practice charge for lack of proof. CSEA argues that 
there is sufficient evidence that Kuchta cancelled CSEA's meeting 
and substituted a meeting with the Association for the purpose of 
assisting the Association in the election. CSEA also argues that 
the ALJ should have drawn a negative inference against UCS 
because Kuchta did not testify. CSEA does not specifically 
except to the ALJ's dismissal of the second improper practice 
charge, although the allegations regarding Frezza's alleged 
promotion are incorporated into its exceptions to the Director's 
decision dismissing the election objections. CSEA excepts to the 
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Director's decision dismissing the election objections for the 
reasons set forth in its exceptions to the AKT's decision. In 
seeking a new election, CSEA argues that there is sufficient 
proof that Kuchta intended to influence the election in her 
dealings with Frezza, in her cancellation of the CSEA meeting in 
March 1992 and substitution of a meeting with the Association, 
and in her exchange with Stewart after the ballots had been 
counted. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the AKT's and the Director's decisions. 
With respect to the first improper practice charge, as the 
ALJ and Director determined, there simply is no proof that Kuchta 
invited Sharp to speak to unit employees on March 31, 1992, or 
that she had cancelled CSEA's meeting to accommodate the 
Association. We affirm this aspect of the decisions for the 
reasons stated by the ALJ and the Director. 
The access allegations in CSEA's second improper practice 
charge hinge on Impallomeni's testimony. The ALJ discredited 
Impallomeni's testimony, a credibility assessment we have no 
reason to disturb inasmuch as it rests upon Impallomeni's 
demeanor as a witness. The allegations regarding Frezza's 
promotion were also properly dismissed. In addition to the bases 
for dismissal cited by the ALJ and the Director, there is no 
evidence that Frezza was a CSEA supporter, or, if so, that Kuchta 
knew it and acted to prevent her from voting. 
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As to the election objections, we are not persuaded that 
there are any actions attributable to the UCS which would have 
influenced a reasonable voter's choice of bargaining agent or 
discouraged participation in the election process. CSEA 
theorizes that Kuchta favored the Association over CSEA and took 
various actions to influence the employees7 vote and to better 
position the Association to win the September 1992 election. But 
if one or more employees believed that Kuchta preferred their 
representation by the Association than by CSEA, nothing in this 
record establishes that Kuchta induced that belief. Kuchta had a 
supervisory style which may have strained her relationships with 
certain unit employees, including Fox, but this has nothing to do 
with the improper practice charges or the election objections 
because it does not establish that Kuchta had a preference as to 
a bargaining agent for unit employees. Although the record shows 
that CSEA had complained about Kuchta's management style, there 
is no evidence of her animus toward or discrimination against 
CSEA nor is there evidence of prior complaints regarding Kuchta's 
alleged support for the Association. The evidence CSEA relies 
upon in its exceptions is not persuasive of any result contrary 
to the ones reached by the ALJ and the Director. The first 
improper practice charge lacks support in the record. There is 
insufficient evidence in the record to establish that Stewart's 
reaction to the Association's election victory was anything other 
than her satisfaction with the Association's victory and the 
demonstration of a personal relationship with Kuchta which 
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permitted an embrace. This statement and action do not evidence, 
as CSEA claims, that Stewart had unintentionally revealed a 
conspiracy in which Kuchta worked against CSEA and in favor of 
the Association. Frezza's statement to Impallomeni regarding her 
decision not to vote, even assuming Impallomeni accurately 
described it,—' again reflects only Frezza's feelings. Nothing 
in the record evidences Kuchta's responsibility for that feeling, 
that Frezza acted on it as opposed to her first stated reason for 
not voting, i.e., her being on vacation on the day of the 
election, or that Kuchta expected such a reaction from Frezza 
because she temporarily had been made full-time. 
CSEA would also support its charges and election objections 
generally on the fact that Kuchta did not testify at the hearing. 
The record shows that Kuchta was ill on the day of the hearing. 
Her testimony had not been requested and a continuation of the 
hearing to permit her to attend was not sought by any party. The 
record may raise questions and suspicions about Kuchta's 
attitudes and conduct, but it does not prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence either the violations of the Act alleged or 
establish sufficient ground to set aside the election. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's and Director's 
decisions are affirmed and the exceptions are dismissed. 
—'Impallomeni testified that she had telephoned Frezza about 
voting and that Frezza told her that she "can't come in to vote" 
because she was "on vacation and besides ... [Kuchta] just gave 
me the promotion and she granted my vacation and I just can't do 
this to her." 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charges 
and election objections must be, and hereby are, dismissed. 
Accordingly, we have this date certified the Ninth Judicial 
District Court Employees Association as the exclusive bargaining 
agent for the unit stipulated to be appropriate. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
^i /JUx. K-. K.\oS6| 
Pauline R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
Walter^Ji. Eisenberg, Member 
) 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions and cross-exceptions 
filed, respectively, by the County of Nassau (County) and the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Nassau County Local 83 0 (CSEA), to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the ALJ held 
that the County violated §2 09-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when a CSEA unit employee, James 
Mattei, was forced to retreat to his former job title under a 
County layoff plan. Mattei is an administrative assistant to the 
president of CSEA's local who was on full-time employee 
organization leave (EOL) at the relevant time from his probation 
j department position of assistant to the deputy director for 
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federal and state aid (aid assistant). The ALJ held, in finding 
a per se violation of §209-a.l(a), that the County decided to 
eliminate Mattel's position because he had used the EOL benefit. 
The ALJ dismissed, however, the §209-a.l(c) allegation because 
the County had not "singled out" Mattel's position for 
elimination because approximately 100 other employees in the 
probation department were also laid off. 
The County argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
finding a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act. It argues that 
the record shows that Mattel's position was eliminated, like many 
others in many departments, in response to a large budget deficit 
and only because he was not responsible for the delivery of 
statutorily mandated services.-'' 
CSEA argues in its cross-exceptions that the ALJ also should 
have found a violation of §2 09-a.l(c) of the Act, but it 
otherwise argues that the AKT's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are correct. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision in part and reverse it in 
part. 
The ALJ's several references to a per se violation have 
unintentionally detracted from the findings he actually made. As 
-
7The probation department is specifically mandated to 
investigate, supervise and perform intake work. The aid 
assistant position is responsible for filing claims for federal 
and state aid, collecting restitution payments for crime victims 
and budgeting. 
Board - U-13358 -3 
we understand the ALJ's rationale, he used a per se reference 
only in the sense that Joseph Sciarrotta, director of the 
County's probation department, was not overtly hostile to CSEA or 
toward Mattel's union activities. The ALJ specifically found, 
however, that Mattel's position was eliminated because he used 
full-time EOL and, therefore, he was expendable. The County is 
correct that, even under the ALJ's decision, the County's motives 
for the elimination of the position are relevant and, in this 
case, dispositive. We do not agree, therefore, with the ALJ's 
statement that "it is irrelevant whether Sciarrotta would have 
submitted the same layoff plan even if Mattei had not been on 
full-time EOL." 
The issue before us is easily stated: Did the County 
eliminate Mattel's position because he used EOL or did it do so, 
as it claims, only because budgetary constraints forced that 
decision? If the former, the County's action violated both 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) because the elimination of a position for 
that reason discriminates against Mattei individually for the 
exercise of clear contract rights-'' and interferes with his and 
all other employees' participation in protected union activities. 
As the ALJ observed, a position eliminated for this reason 
necessarily suggests to employees that there may be adverse 
employment-related consequences for either membership or active 
participation in a union or for securing to oneself the benefits 
^County of Albany, 25 PERB [^3026 (1992) . 
Board - U-13358 • -4 
of the collective bargaining agreement.-7 Alternatively, a 
position abolition for economic reasons does not violate either 
§209-a.l(a) or (c) of the Act even though the occupant of that 
position is a union officer, activist, or agent. The Act does 
not insulate union officers of any type or at any level from the 
adverse effects of an employer's properly motivated managerial 
decisions.-7 The Act ensures that employees are not interfered 
with, discriminated against or improperly advantaged in their 
employment relationship because of their decisions with respect 
to union membership, office or participation. 
There is evidence in the record in support of both the 
County's and CSEA's arguments. The ALJ noted the evidence which 
each party emphasizes in its arguments to us, and he weighed it 
in favor of CSEA, primarily because of the credibility 
resolutions he made, which we have no basis to question. As 
viewed by the ALJ, the record shows that Sciarrotta had long been 
unhappy with Mattel's use of EOL because he was not of service to 
the department in that capacity. His displeasure in this respect 
was noted in his departmental layoff plan. The function, 
personal services, cost and value of all but Mattel's position 
were noted in that plan by Sciarrotta. Of Mattei, Sciarrotta 
noted only his salary and that he was not available to the 
department because he was on EOL, an action which necessitated 
-
7See Hudson Valley Community College, 18 PERB ?[3057 (1985) . 
ySee State of New York - Unified Court System, 26 PERB H3046 
(1993) . 
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that others do his work. Mattel's version of a conversation he 
had with Sciarrotta, which the ALT credited, shows that 
Sciarrotta did not have to eliminate every position which was 
responsible for only nonmandated services. Quite the contrary, 
Sciarrotta told Mattei that he would not have targeted his 
position, despite the many layoffs he had to make, if he had 
known the true extent of the salary reduction Mattei faced as a 
result of the retreat and bumping provisions of the Civil Service 
Law.-7 Sciarrotta also left open the possibility that Mattel's 
position might be maintained if he relinquished his EOL. These 
statements are inconsistent with the County's claim that Mattel's 
aid assistant position had to be eliminated for budget reasons 
only. 
In summary, we cannot conclude on this record, given the 
ALJ's credibility resolutions, that the County would have 
eliminated Mattel's position, even if Mattei had not used the 
contractual EOL. We are not, therefore, presented with any basis 
on which to reverse or modify the ALJ's decision, except insofar 
as we hold that the County's action also violated §209-a.l(c) of 
the Act. For the reasons set forth above, the County's 
exceptions are dismissed, CSEA's cross-exceptions are granted, 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed, except as regards the ALJ's 
disposition of the §209-a.l(c) allegation. 
-'Sciarrotta thought Mattei would suffer a $5,000 salary 
reduction by retreating to his former position of a probation 
officer I, but it was actually about $20,000. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith offer James Mattei reinstatement to the aid 
assistant position under the conditions that existed 
immediately before it was eliminated. 
2. Make James Mattei whole for the loss, if any, of pay 
and benefits suffered by reason of the elimination of 
the aid assistant position and his retreat to the 
probation officer I position, from the date of that 
retreat to the date of the offer of reinstatement, with 
interest at the maximum legal rate. 
3. Cease and desist from improperly eliminating the 
positions of employees who elect to use contractual 
employee organization leave. 
4. Sign and conspicuously post a notice in the form 
attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate information to unit employees. 
DATED: March 21, 19 94 
Mineola, New York 
7<v4\-^ - K ^ 5 < M U 
Pauline R. KmselLa, Chairperson mLm l , 
Walter/'L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric /. Schmertz, Member X 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Nassau Local 830, that the County of Nassau will: 
1. Forthwith offer James Mattei reinstatement to the position of assistant to the deputy director for federal and 
state aid under the conditions that existed immediately before it was eliminated. 
2. Make James Mattei whole for the loss, if any, of pay and benefits suffered by reason of the elimination of that 
position and his retreat to the probation officer I position, from the date of that retreat to the date of the offer 
\ of reinstatement, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
3. Not improperly eliminate the positions of employees who elect to use contractual employee organization 
leave. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Nassau 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3944 
STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3944 
- 2 -
Unit: Included: City Marshal NCOM, court assistant, court 
clerk, court reporter, office typist, office 
typist PT, principal office assistant, senior 
office assistant, and senior office typist. 
Excluded: Chief clerks, employees designated by PERB as 
managerial or confidential, and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER,,—IT—ISORDEREDthat—the-abovenamed-publicemployer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Ninth Judicial District 
Court Employees Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
4!v-V,—>^ •ttrJt L^ Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
A^fc, 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
z l\ Schmertz, Member^/ Eric
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFFS 
SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4008 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY and the 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
j above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chautauqua County Sheriffs 
Supervisors' Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Lieutenant and Jail Supervisor/Administrator. 
) Excluded: All other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Chautauqua County Sheriffs 
Supervisors' Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer—in-good—faith—with—respect—to-wages^—hours^—and—other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED; March 21, 1934 
Mineola, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
M^< A&Z- r. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric 2f. Schmertz, Membei^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAYNE-FINGER LAKES BOCES TEACHERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE-NO-,—G-4-0-3-1-
WAYNE-FINGER LAKES BOARD OF COOPERATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES 
Teachers' Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All professional personnel employed to spend a 
significant amount of time instructing, 
assessing, or counseling students and/or 
adults. 
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Excluded: Administrators, the coordinator of the ST-TEP 
program, other non-teaching coordinators, 
instructors in the adult education LPN program 
who do not provide classroom instruction for 
the duration of the program, dental hygienists, 
registered nurses, teacher assistants and 
substitutes. 
FURTHER^—IT—IS—ORDEREDthat—the above-named—public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES 
Teachers' Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
rssX^ % frVtff 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 20OB, SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, CLC, 
Petitioner, 
- a n d CASE~NO^C^4192 
PORT BYRON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
PORT BYRON CENTRAL SCHOOL CLERICAL UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Local 200B, Service 
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
Certification - C-4192 
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grievances. 
Unit: Included: All regularly employed persons in the following 
titles: Senior Account clerk/Typist, Account 
Clerk/Typist, Senior Typist Clerk, Clerk, 
Typist, A.V. Aide and Teacher Aide 
Excluded: All temporary, substitute and casual employees 
and—all— other employees^ 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Local 200B, Service 
Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
ZcJ:^ ± If, J l 
Pauline R. Kinsella,* Chairperson 
'^fc_2^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
EricAT. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE -HO—C-4-2-1-S 
NORTH COLONIE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the 
position of Special Education Teacher Aide and 
Computer Room Teacher Aide. 
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Excluded; Graduate Student Intern and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
A-s-soc-i-ationy—Inc-Ty—AFS-eME-7—Local—:1-0-0-Oy—AFL-CIO^ —The-duty-to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
fc-i.^T -MrdJu 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
\ 
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RESOLUTION 
Be it resolved that at a meeting of the Public Employment 
Relations Board held on March 21, 1994, the Board delegated to 
Chairwoman Pauline R. Kinsella the following powers and 
authority: 
1. To appoint staff to carry out the duties of the Board; 
2. To administer the Board office and its staff; 
3. To approve the expenditure of Board funds and to approve 
payroll and other vouchers for expenditure; 
4. To issue subpoenas pursuant to Civil Service Law 
§205.5(k) and delegate such power in whole or in part to any 
person appointed by the Board for that purpose. 
5. To certify an employee organization pursuant to Civil 
Service Law §2 07.3 and to issue the certification required by 
Civil Service Law §209.5(a) and §209.6 if such action is required 
between meetings of the Board to best serve the purposes and 
policies of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
DATED: March 21, 1994 
Mineola, New York 
